Extending the classical Legendre's result, we describe all solutions of the inequality |α − a/b| < c/b 2 in terms of convergents of continued fraction expansion of α. Namely, we show that a/b = (rpm+1 ± spm)/(rqm+1 ± sqm) for some nonnegative integers m, r, s such that rs < 2c. As an application of this result, we describe a modification of Verheul and van Tilborg variant of Wiener's attack on RSA cryptosystem with small secret exponent. 0 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. 11A55, 94A60.
Introduction
The most popular public key cryptosystem in use today is the RSA [14] . Its security is based on the difficulty of finding the prime factors of large integers.
The modulus n of a RSA cryptosystem is the product of two large primes p and q. The public exponent e and the secret exponent d are related by ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(n)), where ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) = n − p − q + 1. In a typical RSA cryptosystem p and q have approximately the same number of bits, and e < n. The encryption and decryption algorithms are given by C = M e mod n, M = C d mod n.
To speed up the RSA encryption or decryption one may try to use small public or secret decryption exponent. The choice of a small e or d is especially interesting when there is a large difference in computing power between two communicating devices, e.g. in communication between a smart card and a larger computer. In this situation, it would be desirable for the smart card to have a small secret exponent, and for the larger computer to have a small public exponent in order to reduce the processing required in the smart card.
However, in 1990 Wiener [17] described an attack on a typical RSA with small secret exponent. He showed that if d < n 0.25 , then d is the denominator of some convergent of the continued fraction expansion of e/n, and therefore d can be computed efficiently from the public key (n, e). His result is based on the classical Legendre's theorem on Diophantine approximations of the form |α − a b | < 1 2b 2 . Pinch [13] extended the attack to some other cryptosystems. In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg proposed an extension of Wiener's attack that allows the RSA cryptosystem to be broken by an exhaustive search when d is a few bits longer than n 0.25 . In this paper, we will generalize Legendre's result to Diophantine approximations of the form |α − a b | < c b 2 . We will show that this result leads to the more efficient variant of the above mentioned attacks.
Our attack on RSA will closely follow Wiener's ideas, but let us very briefly mention some other attacks on RSA with small exponent d. In 1999, Boneh and Durfee [3] proposed an attack on RSA with small secret exponent which is based on Coppersmith's lattice-based technique for finding small roots of bivariate modular polynomial equation [4] . The attack works if d < n 0.292 . Similar attack was proposed Blömer and May if d < n 0.29 . Recently, it was noted by Hinek, Low and Teske [8] (see also [7] ) that these theoretical bounds on d are not correct (some quantity which appears in the analysis is not negligible). Also, it should be noted that the Coppersmith's theorem is for univariate case; in the bivariate case it is only a heuristic result for now. On the other hand, it seems that these attacks work well in practice.
Wiener's attack on RSA
In 1990, Wiener [17] described a polynomial time algorithm for breaking a typical (i.e. p and q are of the same size and e < n) RSA cryptosystem if the secret exponent d has at most one-quarter as many bits as the modulus n. The Wiener's attack is usually described in the following form (see [2, 15] ):
If p < q < 2p, e < n and d < 1 3 4 √ n, then d is the denominator of a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of e n . The starting point is the basic relation between exponents ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(n)).
This means that there is an integer k such that ed − kϕ(n) = 1. Now, ϕ(n) ≈ n implies k d ≈ e n . More precisely, we have n − 3 √ n < ϕ(n) < n and
Hence, by Legendre's theorem, k d is a convergent of continued fraction expansion of e n . If [a 0 ; a 1 , a 2 , ...] is the continued fraction expansion of a real number α, then the convergents
Therefore, the denominators grow exponentially. This means that total number of convergents of e n is of order O(log n). If a convergent can be tested in polynomial time, this will give us a polynomial algorithm to determine d.
Wiener proposed the following method for testing convergents. Let a b be a convergent of e n . If it is the correct guess for k d , than ϕ(n) can be computed from ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) = (be − 1)/a. Now we can compute p+q 2 from the identity
and q−p 2 from the identity ( p+q We have seen in the previous example that the correct convergent was the last convergent with denominator less than 1
n. This suggests that perhaps it is not necessary to test all convergents. We will justify this assertion.
To do that, we need more precise estimate of | k d − e n |, which corresponds to better approximation of ϕ(n). Assume that p < q < 2p. Then (p+q) 2 n = 2 + p 2 +q 2 pq and thus 2 √ n < p + q < 3
In the opposite direction we have
We may assume that n > 10 8 . Then k d < 1.00023 e n , and finally
Similarly we find that
In the rest of the paper we will work under the assumption that p < q < 2p, but the arguments can be easily modified to the case p < q < 8p.
From (1) and (2) we may conclude that k d is unique (odd) convergent satisfying 2e
Indeed, this follows from the fact that if p m /q m and p m+2 /q m+2 are two successive (odd) convergents of a real number α, then p m+2 /q m+2 at least twice better approximation of α than p m /q m , which is direct consequence of the following well-known property of convergents (see [9, Theorems 9 and 13])
and m is the unique odd positive integer satisfying this inequality. This observations lead to an efficient algorithm for finding the correct convergent in the Wiener's attack. Namely, k d = pm qm , where m is the smallest odd positive integer such that q m q m+1 > n √ n 4.244e .
As suggested in the original Wiener's paper, the attack can be slightly improved by using better approximation to k d , e.g. e f , where f = n − 2 √ n + 1. This can be combined with known extensions of Legendre's theorem. Namely, there is an old result of Fatou [6] (see also [11, p. 16] 
In 1981, Worley [18] (see also [5] and [12] 
If d < 4.04 4 √ n, then 0.1221 √ n < 2 d 2 and d can be found in polynomial time (which extends the Wiener's attack by the factor 12).
More general extensions of Wiener's attack will be considered in next sections.
Verheul and van Tilborg variant of Wiener's attack
In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg [16] proposed the following extension of Wiener's attack.
Let m be the largest (odd) integer satisfying pm qm − e n > 2.122 e n √ n . Search for k d between fractions of the form rp m+1 +spm rq m+1 +sqm , i.e. consider the system
The determinant of the system satisfies |p m+1 q m − q m+1 p m | = 1, and therefore the system has (positive) integer solutions: r = dp m − kq m s = kq m+1 − dp m+1 .
If r and s are small, then they can be found by an exhaustive search.
Let us estimate the number of steps in this exhaustive search, i.e. let us find upper bounds for r and s.
The estimate for s depends on the sign of the number e n − p m+1 q m+1 − 2.122e n √ n . (We may expect that this number will be positive in 50% of the cases.) Assume that e n − p m+1 q m+1 > 2.122e n √ n . Then
.
Also, q m+1 > q m+2 a m+2 +1 . Putting all these estimates together we obtain r < 2.122(a m+3 + 2)(a m+2 + 1)D,
Hence, in this case the number of steps is bounded by 2.122(a m+3 + 2)(a m+2 + 1)D 2 .
Assume now that e n − p m+1 q m+1 ≤ 2.122e n √ n . Then
Since in this case is already p m+1 q m+1 close enough to e n , we have the estimate for q m+1 which is analogous to the estimate for q m+2 in the previous case: In [16] , the authors propose that with reasonable probability (20%) the number of steps can be bounded by 256D 2 . It is indeed true if we have in mind that partial quotients a i 's are usually very small. In [10, p. 352 ] the distribution of the partial quotients of a random real number α is given. Approximately, a i will be 1 with probability 41.5%, a i = 2 with probability 17.0%, a i = 3 with probability 9.3%, a i = 4 with probability 5.9%, etc. Our analysis shows that the success of Verheul and van Tilborg attack (when D 2 is of reasonable size) depends heavily on the size of corresponding partial quotients a m+1 , a m+2 and a m+3 . And although they are usually small, we cannot exclude the possibility that at least one of them is large (see Examples 2 and 3). Namely, the probability that a i ≥ x is equal to log 2 (1 + 1
x ), and this is a slowly decreasing function.
In Section 5 we will propose a method how to overcome this problem and remove the dependence on partial quotients. A general result on Diophantine approximation from the next section will allow us to obtain more precise information on r and s which will reduce the number of steps in the search.
Extension of Legendre's theorem
Theorem 1. Let α be an irrational number and let a, b be coprime nonzero integers, satisfying the inequality
where c is a positive real number. Then (a, b) = (rp m+1 ±sp m , rq m+1 ±sq m ), for some nonnegative integers m, r and s such that rs < 2c.
Proof. Assume that α < a b , the other case is completely analogous. Let m be the largest odd integer satisfying
If a b > p 1 q 1 , we will take m = −1, following the convention that p −1 = 1, q −1 = 0.
Let us define the numbers r and s by:
Since |p m+1 q m − p m q m+1 | = 1, we conclude that r and s are integers, and since p m+1 q m+1 < a b ≤ pm qm , we have that r ≥ 0 and s > 0. From the maximality of m, we have that
Therefore, we obtain the following inequality (5) r 2 − sra m+2 + ca m+2 > 0.
We will consider (5) as a quadratic inequality in r.
Assume for a moment that s 2 a m+2 ≥ 4c. Then s 4 a 2 m+2 − 4cs 2 a m+2 ≥ (s 2 a m+2 − 4c) 2 , and therefore (5) The first possibility gives us the condition rs < 2c, as claimed in the theorem. Let us consider the second possibility, i.e.
Let us define t = sa m+2 − r. Since p m+2 q m+2 < a b , we conclude that t is a positive integer. Now we have a = rp m+1 + sp m = (sa m+2 − t)p m+1 + sp m = sp m+2 − tp m+1 , b = rq m+1 + sq m = (sa m+2 − t)q m+1 + sq m = sq m+2 − tq m+1 , and the condition (6) becomes st < 2c.
Hence we proved the statement of the theorem under assumption that s 2 a m+2 ≥ 4c.
Assume now that s 2 a m+2 < 4c. Since r < sa m+2 , we have two possibilities. If r < 1 2 sa m+2 , then rs < 1 2 s 2 a n+2 < 2c, and if r ≥ 1 2 sa m+2 , then t = sa m+2 − r ≤ 1 2 sa m+2 and st ≤ 1 2 s 2 a m+2 < 2c.
Remark 1. It is not clear from the proof whether above theorem is valid for rationals a b such that a b < p 0 q 0 = α . But this case corresponds to the minus case with m = 0 is the statement of the theorem. Indeed, let s
The statement of the theorem is valid also for rational numbers α. Indeed, if α ∈ Q, then there exist an integer j ≥ 0 such that α = p j q j . The proof is identical as in the irrational case, unless α < a b <
. If we define positive integers r and s by a = rp j + sp j−1 , b = rq j + sq j−1 , then the inequalities α − a b = s bq j < c b 2 and b > rq j imply rsq j < sb < cq j , and finally rs < c.
Similar result as our Theorem 1 was proved, with different methods, by Worley. In [18, Theorem 1] , it was shown that there are three types of solutions of the inequality (4) . Two types correspond to + and − signs in (rp m+1 ± sp m , rq m+1 ± sq m ), while Theorem 1 shows that the third type can be omitted.
Theorem 1 extends results for c = 1 and c = 2 cited in Section 2. The result for c = 2 has already found applications in solving some Diophantine equations. In [12] , it is applied to the problem of finding positive integers a and b such that (a 2 + b 2 )/(ab + 1) is an integer, and in [5] it is used for solving the family of Thue inequalities |x 4 − 4cx 3 y + (6c + 2)x 2 y 2 + 4cxy 2 + y 4 | ≤ 6c + 4.
We hope that Theorem 1 will also find its application in Diophantine analysis.
A variant of Wiener's attack
In this section we propose new variant of Wiener's attack. It is very similar to Verheul and van Tilborg attack, but instead of exhaustive search after finding the appropriate starting convergent, this new variant also uses estimates which follow from Diophantine approximation (Theorem 1).
Let m be the largest (odd) integer such that p m q m > e n + 2.122e n √ n .
We have two possibilities depending on whether the inequality p m+2 q m+2 ≥ k d is satisfied or not.
Assume first that p m+2 q m+2 ≥ k d . We are searching for k d among the fractions of the form r p m+3 +s p m+2 r q m+3 +s q m+2 . As in Section 3, we have q m+2 > 4 √ n 2.122(a m+3 + 2) .
Now we have
Hence, k d can be recovered in at most r s < 0.1295(a m+3 +2) a m+3 D 2 ≤ 0.3885 D 2 steps. Here D = d/ 4 √ n, as before.
Assume now that p m+2 q m+2 < k d . We have
We are in the conditions of the proof of Theorem 1, and we conclude that 
. We have the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs (r, s):
< 5.248D 2 + D 2 log(0.707 max( (a m+3 +2)a m+2 , (a m+2 +1)(a m+1 +1))).
We have the same upper bound for the number of possible pairs (s, t).
Hence, the number of steps in this attack is O(D 2 log A) (A = max{a i : i = m + 1, m + 2, m + 3}). We may compare this with Verheul Hence m = 5 and we are searching for the secret exponent among the numbers of the form 26r + 19s or 487s − 26t or 4896r + 487s . By applying Wiener's test, we find that s = 12195, t = 77 gives the correct value for d, d = 5936963. Let us compare these numbers s and t with the numbers r and s obtained by an application of the Verheul and van Tilborg attack to the same problem. We obtain the same number s = 12195, but the other number r = 219433 is much larger than t = 77, which is in a good agreement with our theoretical estimates.
Example 3. Let us take n = 7978886869909 again. For 1000 ≤ d ≤ 1000000, we compare the quantities rs, obtained by Verheul and van Tilborg attack, with the quantity D 2 . The maximal value for rs/D 2 is 78464.2 and it is attained for d = 611131. There are 591 d's for which rs/D 2 is greater than 1000. The average value of rs/D 2 for d in the given interval is 15.69.
Similar analysis for the attack introduced in this section gives that the average value of the quantity min(rs, st, r s )/D 2 for d in interval 1000 ≤ d ≤ 1000000 is 0.8397, with maximal value 4.026 attained for d = 437561.
